成本分担定价方式的装备采购博弈研究

承包商的努力程度直接决定了装备的制造成本。为有效激励承包商降低装备制造成本，提高装备采购效益，基于里昂惕夫劳资博弈模型建立了成本分担定价方式的装备采购博弈模型。并在承包商边际效用非线性和定价方式多变量的假设基础上，分别对价格、成本、承包商努力程度和承包商效用之间的关系进行了研究，对原模型进行了拓展，为定价方式中参数的确定提供了量化方法。     

导弹最优突防机动方式研究

将导弹的突防-拦截问题简化到某一平面上,基于此问题的非线性模型,确定了以突防导弹侧向机动为输入,拦截导弹脱靶量为输出的非线性状态方程.针对所研究问题的最优控制类型,构造了系统的Hamilton函数,并通过极大值原理,研究了在平面内导弹机动能力一定的情况下最优规避机动方式.对于简化后的系统线性模型,以机动方式的基波分量为输入,用伴随系统分析方法,通过拦截导弹脱靶量的稳态解,计算了最优的机动频率.     

A cooperative game in search theory

Search theory originates from the military research efforts of WWII. Most researchers of that period modeled their search games in noncooperative games, where players are enemies or compete against each other. In this article, we deal with a cooperative search game, where multiple searchers behave cooperatively. First we describe several search problems and discuss the possibility of a coalition or cooperation among searchers. For the cooperative search game, we define a function named quasi‐characteristic function, which gives us a criterion similar to the so‐called characteristic function in the general coalition game with transferable utility. The search operation includes a kind of randomness with respect to whether the searchers can detect a target and get the value of the target. We also propose a methodology to divide the obtained target value among members of the coalition taking account of the randomness. As a concrete problem of the cooperative search game, we take the so‐called search allocation game, where searchers distribute their searching resources to detect a target in a cooperative way and the target moves in a search space to evade the searchers. Lastly, we discuss the core of the cooperative search allocation game. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

基于粗糙集理论的装备保障指挥系统效能评估指标体系约简

针对目前建立的装备保障指挥系统效能评估指标体系评价指标繁多,存在重复、等价的不足,通过验证各评价指标相对于决策属性是否必要与验证各子集组合相对于决策属性是否独立,建立了基于粗糙集理论的装备保障指挥系统效能评估指标体系约简方法,对评价指标进行了约简,建立了约简的装备保障指挥系统效能评估指标体系,可为装备保障指挥系统效能分析提供依据。     

社区体育开展的理论依据与现状

社区体育发展理论与实践不仅关系到人们身体健康大事,更关系到和谐社会的大事。随着我国城市化进程的加快,我国社区体育无论从理论还是实践都有较大的发展,但还有许多不足之处,正确认识我国社区体育现状有利于其更加健康的发展。     

灰色理论和模糊数学相结合的装备保障能力评估模型

军事装备保障能力的评估研究.对于战斗力的形成和保持有着重要意义.以灰色理论和模糊数学为基础,提出了一种新的装备保障能力评估模型,它是由AHP、灰色聚类分析,模糊评判综合集成而成的,既能体现装备保障能力评估的模糊性,又能充分利用信息,避免了使用单一模糊数学方法的不合理之处,为全面系统评估军事装备保障能力提供了一种新的途径.     

建构主义教学论与教学模式改革

建构主义学习观强调学习的建构性、社会性和情境性 ,对促进教学方法的变革将有重要意义。文章运用建构教学观辨证分析了传统教学模式 ,综合现代以知识为中心、以学生为中心和行为主义理论等现代教育思想 ,分析了传授———建构教学法、合作、探究学习方法。     

强化军人精神支柱的途径

在新形势下 ,围绕“打得赢、不变质”两个历史性课题 ,强化精神支柱 ,坚定理想信念 ,应努力建设良好的政治环境 ,以正确的思想理论、昂扬的革命精神和严格的组织纪律来教育、激励和约束官兵 ,不断强化军人精神支柱。     

Ordering and controlling the dimensions of strategy

Colin Gray’s dimensions of strategy, built upon the earlier work of Clausewitz and Howard, has theoretical, practical, and pedagogic value for the Strategic Studies community. This paper further develops the theory, arguing that the dimensions can be controlled or managed to improve strategic performance. The dimensions are divided into two categories: “internal” and “external” to the process of strategy. The paper describes the dynamic process by which the internal dimensions, which can be controlled, are used to exert influence over the external dimensions that are beyond the control of the strategist. It is argued that six dimensions hold the key to strategic success: politics and the five dimensions concerned with warfighting. This conclusion validates the Clausewitzian paradigm with its emphasis on policy and battle.     

Timely exposure of a secret project: Which activities to monitor?

A defender wants to detect as quickly as possible whether some attacker is secretly conducting a project that could harm the defender. Security services, for example, need to expose a terrorist plot in time to prevent it. The attacker, in turn, schedules his activities so as to remain undiscovered as long as possible. One pressing question for the defender is: which of the project's activities to focus intelligence efforts on? We model the situation as a zero‐sum game, establish that a late‐start schedule defines a dominant attacker strategy, and describe a dynamic program that yields a Nash equilibrium for the zero‐sum game. Through an innovative use of cooperative game theory, we measure the harm reduction thanks to each activity's intelligence effort, obtain insight into what makes intelligence effort more effective, and show how to identify opportunities for further harm reduction. We use a detailed example of a nuclear weapons development project to demonstrate how a careful trade‐off between time and ease of detection can reduce the harm significantly.